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he Kosovo issue has reached a state of 
impasse in the UN Security Council, 
with Russia having made it clear that it 
would veto any resolution recognising 
Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, unless 
Serbia would agree to this, which it will not - 
and indeed this is now made much more 
difficult by its newly revised constitution. And 
as long as Russia takes the lead with this 
blocking position, China is with them too. 
Neither is interested in Kosovo per se, but 
rather in their own domestic, regional and geo-
political interests.  
Yet Kosovo has a case for secession relying on 
normative criteria that go way beyond the 
narrow legal formalism of votes in the UNSC. 
Scholars of international relations have 
identified criteria for ‘just secession’, 
complementing the better known argument of 
‘just war’.
1 The essence of this argument is that 
secession may be justified in the event that a 
well identified people and territory have 
suffered a grave injustice at the hands of the 
central power (such as mass deportation or 
genocide, or credible threats thereof); that this 
is a last resort solution; and that the seceding 
entity also has a reasonable chance of 
establishing proper governance for itself. On 
these grounds, Kosovo can make a serious 
case, and a categorically stronger one than that 
                                                 
1 See Bruno Coppieters, “The Kosovo Trilemma”, due to 
be published in the second edition of Bruno Coppieters 
and Nick Fotion (eds), Moral Constraints on War: 
Principles and Cases, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
forthcoming 2008.  
advanced by many other would-be secessionist 
entities, such as the Spanish Basques.  
The situation is now a very dangerous one, with 
several obviously unattractive scenarios 
threatening to unfold: unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo, followed by US 
recognition and a split within the EU; 
destabilisation of the situation on the ground 
between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian 
communities; and knock-on effects in other parts 
of the Balkans such as Macedonia and Bosnia.  
If Russia has put a credible roadblock in place 
for any classic international resolution of the 
issue, the EU has to find a way around this 
roadblock, since it has to bear the likely costs of 
the unattractive scenarios. Moreover, it alone – 
being committed to the full integration of the 
whole of the Balkans into the EU – has the 
conceivable means to invent a solution that is 
not blocked by far-away third parties. 
The solution could be based on the Ahtisaari 
plan. But this was designed for getting UNSC 
endorsement, which we now know will not 
materialise. The plan needs therefore to be 
adapted to this new situation, as the Crisis Group 
has argued.
2 Here we go further in sketching the 
systemic relationship that Kosovo might have 
with the EU. This could be viewed as an 
                                                 
2 This argument is made by the International Crisis Group, 
in “Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s 
Responsibility”, Policy Report, 21 August 2007. However 
the ICG’s main idea is for the EU to acquiesce in 
Kosovo’s independence through a combination of positive 
votes and constructive abstentions in the EU Council of 
Ministers.  
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amendment to the Ahtisaari plan, but it could 
also be viewed as a more fundamental change 
of paradigm, namely to withdraw the matter 
from the UN’s legal-procedural conventions 
regarding international recognition, and to 
place it instead into the framework of 
European integration, where it is no longer 
subject to Russian or Chinese control. 
The EU would open negotiations with Kosovo 
over an agreement defining a new status. The 
Ahtisaari plan would be the basis for 
negotiations over Kosovo’s own institutions 
and powers over internal matters, and for 
special arrangements over security and external 
policy, with the EU providing inter alia 
guarantees for the Serb minority. Kosovo 
would also be subject however to the 
jurisdiction of the European Union in areas of 
EU law identified in the agreement. Since the 
ultimate objective, as for all the Balkans, is full 
integration with the EU, the principle would be 
one of general application of EU law, subject 
only to exemptions and transitional 
arrangements. The EU would administer its 
policies and programmes in Kosovo in 
collaboration with the government of Kosovo. 
It would for example treat Kosovo as a special 
participant in the EU’s structural funds and 
education programmes such as Erasmus. There 
would be a key task, starting immediately, to 
identify which blocks of EU law should be 
applied first in Kosovo, and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
EU directives would, as usual, have to be 
transposed into Kosovo laws, and short-cuts 
would have to be found to do this without 
excessive burdens, for which the solution could 
be a combination of ‘Slovenia’ and 
‘Liechtenstein’. By this we mean that Slovenia 
as fellow ex-Yugoslav polity is perfectly 
placed to help Kosovo through the process; and 
that Liechtenstein as a micro-state was able to 
devise abbreviated legal procedures for 
adopting the whole of the EU market acquis.  
Kosovo would not have a flag at the UN but, of 
more immediate importance, it would issue 
passports to its citizens, which would be 
recognised by the EU, followed soon by most 
of the rest of the world.
3  
                                                 
3 The citizens of the islands of Jersey and Guernsey have 
passports carrying the designation “European Union”, 
Kosovo would have a Permanent Representation 
accredited to the EU in Brussels, which would 
have special institutional links to all the 
institutions of the EU, thus confirming and 
defining its special status.  
The question for European policy-makers is how 
to spell out this proposal as an imaginative 
element of a wider and longer European 
integration strategy for the whole region. The 
legal status of Kosovo in relation to the EU 
would be defined in a binding agreement. The 
key words in this agreement would be a delicate 
matter for negotiation, including such options as 
special EU region, or territory, or associated 
territory or state. Kosovo could be ‘part of the 
EU’, to employ language sometimes used in 
agreements dealing with entities with special 
relationships with the EU. Such words have 
different connotations in different contexts, and 
their precise legal meaning has to be found in the 
supporting legal texts. The EU and Kosovo 
would thus decide between themselves what 
words to use and what meaning to give them in 
the precise context of EU law. Kosovo would 
not be a Member State of the EU for the 
foreseeable future, but the EU has already shown 
remarkable political and legal agility in 
accommodating special integrative relationships, 
ranging from the status of Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein in the European Economic Area, 
through to arrangements with various associated 
entities and territories. For example the Channel 
Islands are ‘part’ of the EU without being ‘part’ 
of the United Kingdom. 
For the Kosovo leaders it is now time for a 
reality check. The writing is on the wall, and it 
reads: “Russia denies you classic independence, 
with UN-legitimised recognition”. They would 
be advised to make the best, rather than worst of 
what the EU might offer, which cannot be 
vetoed by Russia, China or Serbia. Above all 
they should choose a route that minimises the 
chances of violent destabilisation. Kosovo may 
make political declarations soon about their 
independence; but this should be framed in a 
way that allowed the EU to avoid formal UN-
level recognition. The offer of ‘special status as 
part of the EU’ would not be full legal 
                                                                                
and “British Isles” as well as Jersey or Guernsey. Taiwan 
issues passports entitled “Republic of China – Taiwan” on 
the cover and can be used worldwide without UN 
membership, which is blocked by Beijing.    Kosovo merits “special status as part of the EU”| 3 
recognition as a fully independent sovereign 
state, but it would amount to functional 
recognition since the EU would be entering 
into a complex agreement with the government 
and would be operating policies in Kosovo. It 
would also leave the door open for definitive 
legal settlement, to be targeted at the time 
when both Serbia and Kosovo would be 
acceding to the EU as full members
4. 
For its part, Serbia would not be asked to 
change its constitution, but invited instead to 
only cooperate with the plan and continue its 
European integration course. To help calm 
spirits, Serbia could be offered an upgrade in 
status from its present vague ‘membership 
perspective’ to ‘membership candidate’, thus 
joining Croatia and Macedonia in this 
category. Maybe later there could be mutually 
agreed territorial adjustments between Serbia 
and Kosovo, but this is unlikely to be agreed 
now by the EU out of concern for knock-on 
effects elsewhere
5. Serbia seeks to keep a small 
degree of functional as well as legal 
sovereignty over Kosovo, for example for 
border management. The way to achieve the 
functional objective should be to negotiate a 
tripartite agreement between the EU, Serbia 
and Kosovo on such questions, in which the 
legal hierarchy would be the typical European 
one, for supremacy of EU law, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
Would EU member states that are reluctant to 
recognise a declaration of independence by 
Kosovo as a fully independent state find this 
formula of a special status within the EU more 
acceptable? The argument to be put, for 
example to Spain worried about the Basques, 
would be that Kosovo gets a special status but 
one that falls short of a full member state; and 
it deserves this special treatment because it 
suffered a grave injustice at the existential 
level. No minority within the EU is anywhere 
near able to make such a claim. 
                                                 
4 At a meeting of the European Parliament in January 
2007, the former foreign minister of Greece, George 
Papandreou, proposed to Kosovo that “you can have 
your independence when you become a member of the 
EU”. 
5 As suggested by the International Crisis Group, op. cit.  
Would the formula set a precedent for other 
states and entities that are presently outside the 
EU and seek accession or an enhanced status in 
relation to it? Up to a point, yes. The case exists 
more widely for devising systemic arrangements 
(no doubt with variants on a case-by-case basis) 
for functional integration with the EU of parts of 
Europe that cannot easily fit as conventional 
member states. For Kosovo, as for the rest of the 
Balkans, the ‘membership perspective’ remains, 
but it is going to take many years for the EU to 
adapt its institutions beyond what is in prospect 
with the current Treaty reform negotiations in 
order to absorb another major enlargement, and 
before the Balkan states fully satisfy the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
For several years, the slogan for Kosovo has 
been “standards before status”, in which status 
was implicitly understood by Kosovars to mean 
classic independence, with a flag at the UN. This 
is impossible for the time being and for the 
foreseeable future. But at the same time the 
status quo is itself unsustainable. This presents a 
classic dilemma situation, which requires 
therefore a special solution, which would be a 
special status that the EU, and only the EU, 
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